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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
No. 12-2432 
 
________________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LAMONT LAPRADE, 
a/k/a Lamont El, 
       Appellant 
 
 
________________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00019-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
 
________________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO, and FUENTES, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2013) 
 
 
________________ 
OPINION 
 
________________ 
AMBRO, 
 
Circuit Judge 
 Lamont Laprade was tried and convicted by a jury in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania on multiple counts relating to the armed robbery of a credit union.  He 
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argues on appeal that confessional statements he made to law enforcement officers 
following his arrest should have been suppressed, his due process right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty was violated by the jury seeing him in prison clothes during 
trial, and his conviction for carrying or using a firearm in connection with the robbery 
should be overturned because there was insufficient evidence on which to convict.  We 
disagree, and affirm his conviction on all counts. 
I.  Background 
 
On January 8, 2010, Laprade and David Mathis—who apparently became 
acquainted as inmates at a federal prison in Virginia—robbed the Westmoreland 
Community Credit Union in Greensburg, Pennsylvania.  That morning, after meeting at a 
Motel 6 in the Pittsburgh area, Laprade and Mathis went on a shopping spree to purchase 
items—including gloves, a ski mask, and a laundry bag—for commission of the robbery.  
Later that afternoon, Mathis entered the Credit Union armed with a Glock 9 millimeter 
handgun.  He fired two shots, one of them striking a teller.  After taking cash totaling 
$6,878.00, Mathis left the credit union and entered the passenger side of a Range Rover 
driven by Laprade.   
Laprade attempted to leave the Credit Union’s parking lot but his exit route was 
blocked by a customer entering the lot.  When the driver refused to reverse her car, 
Mathis leaned out of the car and fired a shot.  The driver ducked and heard two more 
shots fired.  She did not look up until the Ranger Rover had disappeared, and did not see 
who fired the latter shots.  Law enforcement officers, however, recovered three spent 
casings in the parking lot, two 9 millimeter casings and one .45 caliber casing.  
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A state trooper subsequently spotted the Range Rover (the details of which had 
been broadcast on police channels), and a chase ensued.  Abandoning the vehicle, 
Laprade and Mathis ran into the woods.  A laundry bag containing $6,878.00 was later 
discovered in the vehicle. 
Because there was a thick layer of snow on the ground, police were able to track 
the two men.  Laprade was arrested at a nearby barn without incident.  Mathis, having 
spent the night outdoors in near-zero temperatures, was arrested the next day at a mall.   
Following his arrest, Laprade admitted that Mathis had asked him to come to 
Western Pennsylvania for a “job” and that Mathis had requested Laprade bring 
ammunition with him, which he did.  Laprade also admitted that Mathis discharged his 9 
millimeter weapon twice in the parking lot and that Laprade had discharged his .45 
caliber weapon when Mathis told him he needed to fire his weapon as well.   
Federal agents and police searched for Laprade’s .45 caliber pistol but were unable 
to recover it.  A subsequent search of Laprade’s residence in West Virginia, however, 
resulted in the discovery of a partially full box of .45 caliber ammunition.   
Laprade was charged with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 
armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), conspiracy to commit robbery 
and armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and using and carrying a .45 
caliber handgun in connection with the armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).   
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Laprade moved to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers 
following his arrest on the ground that the statements were not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  The District Court denied the motion.  
Although he was represented by counsel at the suppression hearing, Laprade 
proceeded pro se at trial.  A jury convicted him on all counts.  The Court subsequently 
sentenced him to a prison term of 190 months, followed by five years of supervised 
release.   
Laprade timely filed a notice of appeal, and is represented by counsel on appeal. 
II.  Jurisdiction 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Laprade’s criminal prosecution pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III.  Discussion 
A. 
 
Suppression of Statements 
Laprade, as noted, moved to suppress statements he made following his arrest on 
the ground that the statements were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Specifically, 
he asserted (1) he was under the influence of narcotics at the time the statements were 
made, (2) his will was overborne by promises made by law enforcement officers that he 
would be prosecuted in state rather than federal court, and (3) his statements were the 
result of impermissible threats and inducements made to him by law enforcement 
officers.   
The District Court denied Laprade’s motion to suppress.  The Court, based on the 
testimony of two special agents and a Pennsylvania state police trooper, found as follows: 
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The evidence establishes that [Laprade] was able to give clear 
and lucid responses to questions asked.  [He]  displayed no 
signs of drug or alcohol intoxication. 
 
In addition, the evidence established that no promises were 
made to [Laprade] that he would be prosecuted in state court; 
only that officers would make [his] preference known to 
prosecutors.  No other promises were made to [him] which 
would have rendered his statements involuntary, coerced and, 
therefore, inadmissible. 
 
Laprade offered no evidence at the hearing. 
 “We review a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress under a mixed 
standard of review.  We review findings of fact for clear error, but we exercise plenary 
review over legal determinations.”  United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236–37 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
On appeal, Laprade continues to assert that his statements were inadmissible for 
the reasons noted above.  However, he points to no evidence in the record suggesting the 
District Court’s factual findings to the contrary—i.e., that he showed no signs of 
intoxication, no promises were made he would be tried in state court, and no other threats 
or inducements were made—were incorrect, let alone any evidence showing these 
findings were clear error.  Laprade, in fact, does not cite to the record at all.  Regardless 
of the legal bases of his arguments (about which we express no opinion), without 
underlying factual support they cannot be successful. 
B. 
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Laprade was convicted of using and carrying a .45 caliber firearm in connection 
with the armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).  He argues on 
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appeal that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on 
this charge.  According to Laprade, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that he 
possessed a .45 caliber firearm during the crime because that firearm was never 
recovered, no eyewitnesses saw him discharge a firearm, and the majority of shell casings 
found at the scene were fired from Mathis’s 9 millimeter firearm.   
Because Laprade did not move for a judgment of acquittal on this ground at the 
close of evidence, we review for plain error.  United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 381 
(3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260–61 (3d Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)) 
(“Where, as here, a defendant does not preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence 
by making a timely motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, this 
Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.”).  “The plain error standard 
is met when ‘(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to 
reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the 
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Marcus, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2010)). 
We are not persuaded the jury committed plain error in convicting Laprade on this 
charge.  Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) provides in pertinent part:  
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person 
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
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carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 
possesses a firearm, shall . . . if the firearm is discharged, be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no less than 10 years. 
 
At trial, the Government introduced Laprade’s statements that he carried and discharged 
a .45 caliber handgun in the parking lot as he and Mathis were departing the credit union.  
Those statements were corroborated by evidence introduced at trial that a .45 caliber shell 
was recovered from the parking lot and that a partially full box of .45 caliber ammunition 
was recovered from Laprade’s home.  This is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 
convict.   
 It is settled that “the government may defeat a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge on circumstantial evidence alone.”  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)).  There is 
no requirement that there be eyewitness testimony of the defendant firing the weapon or 
that the authorities recover the weapon.  Moreover, that all but one of the casings 
recovered at the crime scene were 9 millimeter casings from Mathis’s firearm is in fact 
consistent with Laprade’s statement that he fired his weapon once.  On this record, we 
have little difficulty concluding that a reasonable jury could convict Laprade for using the 
.45 caliber firearm. 
C. 
 
Due Process Rights 
Finally, Laprade asserts he was denied due process by his wearing an orange 
jumpsuit during trial.  We have held, however, that a defendant’s due process right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty is only infringed if he is compelled to appear 
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before a jury in his prison clothes.  Gaito v. Brierley, 485 F.2d 86, 88 n.3 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(“‘A defendant may not remain silent and willingly go to trial in prison garb and 
thereafter claim error.’” (quoting Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(alteration omitted))).  There is no indication that the Government forced Laprade to wear 
the jumpsuit during trial.  Indeed, there is no record of Laprade objecting to his attire at 
all during trial.1
*    *    *    *    * 
  Accordingly, we have no basis on which to hold Laprade’s due process 
rights were violated. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm Laprade’s conviction.  
 
                                              
1 Laprade first raised this issue in a post-conviction motion.  See United States v. El, Cr. 
No. 10-19-2, 2012 WL 1609910 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2012).  The District Court rejected 
Laprade’s assertion that his due process rights were infringed because there was no 
suggestion the attire was compelled.  Id. at *1. 
